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REVIEW OF ORE PERSONNEL INCREASE  
IN APPOSITION TO INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

25 January 1949

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### REVIEW OF ORE PERSONNEL INCREASE

#### IN APPPOSITION TO INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

##### The Problem:

At the instance of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant Director, ORE, directed that Plans and Policy Staff make a study of the increase of approximately 15 per cent in personnel of ORE in October 1948 over June 1948 with a view to determining whether it has been justified by an increase in intelligence production.

Personnel strength figures are readily reducible to statistical treatment, but the difficulties of translating qualitative assessments and of attempting to arrive at a common unit of measurement equally applicable to the several categories of effort have rendered it impossible to produce flat percental figures with regard to production effort.

An equally knotty problem attaches to the diversity of operational methods within ORE components. In the case of some components certain types of papers are produced in appreciable quantity, while other components do their preliminary work by consultation and conference, or both. Collation of factual matter germane to the production efforts of two or more components has in some cases therefore been impracticable.

Finally, certain factors entirely beyond the control of ORE necessarily create variables, occupy the time of personnel, and have a direct bearing upon the net production. Included in matters bearing upon production in such fashion are: the impact of international developments, which regulates the amount of current intelligence production necessary, and determines the component of cognizance; the availability and adequacy of information with which to produce quasi-basic intelligence, such as SR's; increased demands by high-level policy bodies for special estimates and background information, which result in diversion of effort from the normal type of study; recently added responsibilities by components for supplying information to new Governmental organizations such as ECA, Voice of America, etc., requiring considerable time in meetings, conferences, and preparation of materials.

This report does not include General Division, the Chief of which is prepared to report separately to the Assistant Director, R&E, on request.

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Analytical Media:

(a) Personnel percentages: Simple comparison of personnel strength figures, as carried in the records of Administrative Staff requires certain modifications in treatment in order that the true effective strength may be developed. Accordingly, although no elements of ORE have been eliminated from the strength analysis portions of the report, there has been a separation of figures pertaining to production components and those pertaining to coordinating, editorial, administrative, or planning elements.

An adjustment has been made also to eliminate all personnel who were actually absent from duty by reason of: (1) extensive leave without pay; (2) terminal leave; (3) maternity leave; (4) detail to an outside unclassified facility pending security clearance; (5) detail to a different component. Such adjustments have been applied to both control dates. In actuality a further adjustment should be made (but was not) to take cognizance of ineffectives by reason of the need for orienting and training personnel. For example, there is no way of reflecting that one branch was forced to show three professionals on duty on 31 October notwithstanding that their aggregate time on duty was only 19 days.

A breakdown by elements has been made in order that personnel strength data may be compared with production, unit for unit.

(b) Production percentages: All branches and groups of ORE directly concerned with substantive intelligence production were canvassed for the purpose of deriving their own respective computations of production volume during the test period. These were based on preliminary (and fairly arbitrary) categories of types of production. These subsequently were readjusted to group together productions involving comparable research effort, inasmuch as no common unit of measurement could be evolved for application to the widely diverse types of end intelligence.

Chiefs of ORE components assisted materially in synthesizing the consolidated production tables by suggesting methods of reflecting comparative effort. Accordingly it was possible, for the most part, to tabulate the data in a manner consonant with each Chief's evaluation of his own element's effort. Exceptions and modifying observations have been included in the sections of the statistical report where appropriate.

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Preceding each statistical section there has been inserted a brief statement of definitions which is intended to explain the weighting of terms for the section.

### Observations:

There are no criteria for qualitative assessment of intelligence. Any considerations of production are therefore on a purely quantitative basis. Whether this provides a reasonable basis for gauging the efficacy of ORE is self-evident, and any claim that the quality has improved over the test period, or over any other period of time, is a hypothesis not subject to confirmation except by future history.

Nevertheless it is observable, and may be accepted as a theorem, that such factors as readability and thoroughness of intelligence production have improved. This then should be a constant thought in reviewing ORE achievements.

Production effort poses an additional factor difficult of assessment. A brief and pithy production may well represent extraordinary labor on the part of the producers, whereas a relatively long publication may be the product of facile research.

Confidential effort likewise is an expenditure which seldom if ever will show in a review of end production. Consequently many professional man-hours given to discussions, panels, or meetings, all in aid of production, will not be reflected in any way in the quantity of intelligence developed.

Planning, programming, and regulatory mechanics are decidedly necessary, --constantly more so as the production schedules and concepts are stepped up. This will show, in a study of this type, only in the personnel figures. There is no way of indicating the value or volume of such work, yet its value has been confirmed by the more effective operations which it has developed.

The flow of incoming information fluctuates tremendously, generally in direct relation to the course of world events, but sometimes with no attributable cause. Whether or not related to the world situation, an upward trend in volume of information obviously involves both more clerical and more research effort for the mere processing and evaluation of the raw material without regard to its ultimate use in producing intelligence.

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Professional productivity is directly affected by the availability of clerical and supporting personnel, and varies inversely with the necessity for professionals to carry out for themselves the mechanics of procedure. In this connection an almost universal concern was expressed for the failure to fill clerical vacancies. Whether greater production would ensue is conjectural, but it is axiomatic that the possibility of greater (or better) production would be materially enhanced.

The flexibility permitted in the internal organization and administration of ORE components makes exact comparison of effort difficult. In the case of one branch a totally different concept of operation results in non-preparation of rough-draft items for consideration as Daily Summary submissions. In contrast to the methods of other branches, whose submission proposals are prepared in draft, verbal discussions are held and eliminations occur "at the source". Consequently there are no records to indicate the volume of item contributions. This case will be further discussed under Conclusions and under Recommendations.

### Conclusions:

Based upon study, analysis, and observations of the factual material relating to the entire problem, it is concluded:

- (a) That there is but a limited corollary between personnel strength and intelligence production.
- (b) That, nonetheless, adequate staffing of an intelligence research unit will be reflected by qualitative and quantitative gains in production, not necessarily mathematically proportionate.
- (c) That ORE has shown a creditable quantitative increase in production over the period June-October 1948, percentally commensurate with its personnel increases for the same period.
- (d) That external variables, wholly beyond the control of ORE, exert great influence on the volume of intelligence production.
- (e) That, despite the desirability of allowing wide latitude to component chiefs, certain standards of administrative recording are mandatory to deal with surveys of this type.

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Recommendations:

It is recommended:

(a) That AD/ORE use this report as a basis for his verbal reply to the DCI.

(b) That no future studies as broad in scope or as exhaustive as this be undertaken, unless specifically and absolutely required, but, rather, that specific factors which are parts hereof be made the subject of individual administrative study whenever indicated.

(c) That standards of recording work production be prescribed for the use of all components in order that any future needs for statistical data may be met with a minimum of difficulty and a maximum of uniformity.

(d) That the AD/ORE conduct conversations with the Chief of any element whose production does not appear consonant with its personnel strength.

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STAFF INTELLIGENCE

EXPLANATION OF METHOD USED IN STATISTICAL

ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION

In an effort to present the most accurate analysis of staff intelligence production, three categories of information, or production tables, were used. Reasons for this separation are outlined below:

Table I Completed Staff Intelligence Studies

This category shows only the official ORE Estimates, CIA Monthlies, and Situation Reports produced and the originating unit. This breakdown was made so that a lengthy Situation Report would not assume the same relative statistical value as an intelligence memorandum, or paragraph contributions.

Table II Contributions to Staff Intelligence Studies

The second table of production on Staff Intelligence indicates the paragraphs or sections that producing units have written, but will be included as one portion of a complete study published by another unit.

Table III Special Studies and Intelligence Memoranda

In recent months requests for Special Estimates and studies, published as Intelligence Memoranda, have increased. To show this trend, and also to separate these shorter studies from the types of studies in Table I, a separate table is given.

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## STAFF INTELLIGENCE

	<u>June</u>	<u>October</u>
<u>Completed Studies Published:</u> (excluding Memoranda and Special Studies)		
Latin America Branch	--	1 ORE
Near East/Africa Branch	--	2 ORE
	--	2 SR
Western Europe Branch	--	--
Far East/Pacific Branch	2 ORE	1 ORE
Eastern Europe/USSR Branch	--	--
Northern Branch	1 SR	--
Economics Group	--	1 SR
Transportation Group	--	1 ORE
International Org. Group	--	--
Global Survey Group	1 CIA	1 ORE, 1 CIA
Scientific Branch	--	--
	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>

Percentage increase: 150%

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STAFF INTELLIGENCE

	<u>June</u>	<u>October</u>
Special Studies and Memoranda: (Published or in process.)		
Latin America Branch	—	—
Near East/Africa Branch	—	2 IM
	1 Spec.	4 Spec.
Western Europe Branch	18 Spec.	16 Spec.
Far East/Pacific Branch	—	—
Eastern Europe/USSR Branch	2 Spec. (c)	3 Spec. (c)
	4 Spec. (p)	11 Spec. (p)
Northern Branch	1 Spec.	1 Spec.
Economics Group	1 Spec.	4 Spec.
Transportation Group	3 Spec.	2 Spec.
Scientific Branch	1 Spec.	3 Spec.
Internat'l. Org. Group	—	—
Global Survey Group	—	4 IM
	<u>31</u>	<u>50</u>

Percentage Increase: 61%

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

The figures shown on the current intelligence production table are the number of paragraphs or items submitted by ORE producing units to the Current Intelligence Group for publication in the CIA Daily or Weekly Summary.

In July 1948 a policy to reduce the number of items appearing in the Daily was adopted by ORE. Only the most significant events are now included.

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	<u>June</u>	<u>October</u>
<u>Item Contributions:</u>		
Latin America Branch	7 Daily	6 Daily
(Note: This Branch does not pre-write items; they are written only after need is determined in conjunction with Current Group.)	17 Weekly	7 Weekly
Near East/Africa Branch	12 Daily 29 Weekly 4 Map	22 Daily 26 Weekly 15 Notes in Brief 1 Annex
Western Europe Branch	47 Daily 52 Weekly	22 Daily 47 Weekly
Far East/Pacific	15 Daily 1 Weekly	24 Daily 1 Weekly
Eastern Europe/USSR	11 Daily 10 Weekly	5 Daily 20 Weekly
Northern Branch	9 Daily 6 Weekly	9 Daily 6 Weekly
Economics Group	--	--
Transportation Group	1 Daily 2 Weekly	1 Daily 1 Weekly
Scientific Branch	2 Daily	1 Daily
Internat'l. Org. Group	11 Daily 3 Weekly	9 Daily 10 Weekly
Global Survey Group	--	--
	239	244

(+.021%)

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WORKING-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE

Nearly every producing unit of ORE is now publishing "working-level" intelligence. Such intelligence is in nature similar to the types used in the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries, and is therefore measured in terms of item contributions.

See footnote to table of Working-level Intelligence.

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	<u>June</u>	<u>October</u>
<u>Items Published:</u>		
Latin America Branch	(No figures available)	
Near East/Africa Branch	34 Weekly	42 Weekly
	4 Maps	2 Maps
	--	15 Notes in Brief
Western Europe Branch	198 Daily Est.	153 Daily Est.
	--	36 Weekly Est.
	56 Weekly Sum.	51 Weekly Sum.
Far East/Pacific Branch	81 Daily Est.	89 Daily Est.
	29 Weekly Est.	63 Weekly Est.
	56 Weekly Sum.	75 Weekly Sum.
Eastern Europe/USSR Branch	64 Weekly	63 Weekly
Northern Branch	45 Weekly	48 Weekly
Economics Group	--	--
Transportation Group	9 Weekly	20 Weekly
Scientific Branch	3 Spec.	1 Spec.
Internat'l. Org. Group	31 Weekly	30 Weekly
Global Survey Group	--	--
	<u>610</u>	<u>688</u>
	(÷13%)	

Note:

In certain instances the items used in Branch current intelligence are those used in the CIA current intelligence publication. This percentage is small, however, and most of the Branch working-level production is not a duplication.

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